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Abstract 
 
The case of Veith v. Jubelirer (2004) challenges us to find a standard for partisan 
gerrymandering that is judicially discernable and manageable. Without such a standard 
even the most egregious partisan gerrymanders cannot be effectively challenged. 
However, we argue that the way to find a suitable standard is not to embark on a quest for 
D³QHZ´VWDQGDUG5DWKHU LW LV WR WDNH WKHH[LVWLQJYDOLGPHDVXUHV WKDWVFLHQFHJLYHVXV
and show that these can be grounded in constitutionally protected rights. Using recent 
results in social choice theory, we show that the existing partisan symmetry standard can 
be derived from an individual right to equal protection. We also show that the existing 
technology for measuring partisan symmetry can provide a judicially manageable test for 
partisan bias. 
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I. Introduction 
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQVieth v. Jubelirer (2004) challenges us to find a viable 
standard for judging political gerrymandering cases. Although the Court did not come to any 
joint opinion, a majority of Justices indicated that there was currently no viable judicial standard 
for judging partisan gerrymandering cases. Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, argued 
that no such standard could exist in principle and that partisan gerrymandering was a non-
MXVWLFLDEOH ³SROLWLFDO TXHVWLRQ´ -XVWLFH .HQQHG\ DUJXHG WKDW QR VWDQGDUG FXUUHQWO\ H[LVWHG EXW
that one might in principle be found. As a result, until the Court is convinced that a suitable 
standard has be found, there is no possibility of a partisan gerrymandering case succeeding. This 
means that in practice (though not in principle) partisan districting is a non-justiciable political 
question. In the districting round following the Vieth decision, many states have pursued 
maximum partisan advantage, as we will see later in this paper. 
Given the demand for a standard, it might be tempting to go looking for a new standard 
for partisan gerrymandering. Such a strategy, however, would be unfortunate. A decision by the 
Supreme Court may change the law, but it does not change what partisan bias is. What is needed 
is a correct definition and measure of partisan bias. We will argue that social scientists are quite 
capable of measuring partisan bias reliably (see King et al. 2006; Grofman and King 2007). 
Appropriate methodology has been developed, peer-reviewed and implemented, such as the 
partisan symmetry standard (Gelman and King 1994b). However, what is needed is not simply a 
scientific standard of partisan bias; what is needed is a legal standard. It is not enough to show 
that a districting scheme treats parties differently; it is necessary to show that this represents a 
violation of the constitutional rights of individual voters. As Justice Kennedy puts in in his 
 2 
opinion on LULAC v. Perry (2006)ZKDW LV ODFNLQJ LV ³D UHOLDEOHPeasure of unconstitutional 
SDUWLVDQVKLS´LWDOLFVRXUV). 
The problems that come with trying to invent a new standard, as opposed to making use 
of the existing science, can be illustrated by considering the new standard recently proposed by 
Stephanopoulos and McGee (2015). Although the authors claim that this is a measure of the 
partisan symmetry standard discussed in LULAC v. Perry (2006), it is actually something quite 
different.1 The new standard they propose is based on ZKDWWKH\FDOOWKH³HIILFLHQF\JDS´± the 
LGHDWKDWWKHQXPEHURI³ZDVWHGYRWHV´IRUHDFKSDUW\VKRXOGEHHTXDO2 The problem is that it is 
not clear how a standard can be linked to any constitutionally protected right, apart from the 
general fairness argument that the authors make. Furthermore, it is not obvious that each party 
having an equal absolute number of wasted votes is uniquely fair. It could equally well be argued 
that parties should waste the same share of their vote ± so if one party has twice the votes of the 
other, it should waste twice as many. Or it could be argued that the parties should waste the same 
number of votes for every seat they receive. These standards lead to very different results. If a 
                                                 
1 The reason the partisan symmetry approach of Gelman and King (see King et al. 2006) was a 
major advance was that it separates symmetry/bias (whether the districts treat the two parties 
differently) from responsiveness (how much do the districts advantage the larger party, whoever 
that may be). The efficiency gap standard, however, once again conflates these two things. 
Symmetry requires that if the Democrats get a certain number of seats for (say) 60% of the vote, 
then the Republicans must get the same number if they get 60%. It does not matter if the party 
with 60% gets seven seats out of ten, as opposed to six or eight, as long as both parties get the 
same if they attain a 60% vote share. The efficiency gap standard, however, requires that a party 
must receive an additional 20% of the seats for every 10% of the vote it receives over 50% ± if it 
gets 60% of the vote, it must get 70% of the seats. The problem is that there is no obvious basis ± 
in either law or equity ± for demanding this level of responsiveness. In fact there are very good 
reasons why different states should have different levels of responsiveness ± if there are 
geographical concentrations of partisans or majority-minority districts required by the Voting 
Rights Act, then there will be some very safe districts that will lead to low responsiveness. This 
will be misinterpreted by the efficiency gap measure as bias. 
2 A wasted vote is defined as any votes a party receives over 50% in a district it wins, plus any 
votes it receives in a district it loses. 
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plaintiff was to argue based on the Stephanopoulos and McGee efficiency gap standard, the 
defendant could simply reply that there are many equally plausible standards. 
Thus there is no need to invent a new definition or measure for partisan bias, as social 
scientists are already quite capable of defining and measuring this. What is required is to show 
that the partisan bias we measure represents a violation of a constitutionally protected right. In 
the plurality opinion on Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), Justice Scalia challenges the existing 
arguments for the unconstitutionality of political gerrymandering in a fundamental way. The 
argument that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional has been based on the assumption that 
drawing districts to dilute the influence of a political group violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, asserts that it is only individual voters, 
and not political groups, who have a right to equal treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. 
If this is so, then the question of whether there is political gerrymandering appears to be 
cRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ LUUHOHYDQW -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V REMHFWLRQ DSSHDUV GHFLVLYH EHFDXVH WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ
certainly does not enumerate a right of political groups to equal treatment. 
Of course, Justice Scalia was only writing for a plurality of Justices, not for the Court. 
However, Justice Kennedy ± the pivotal fifth Justice in the case ± DFFHSWHG WKH SOXUDOLW\¶V
analysis of previously proposed standards for partisan gerrymandering. In particular, Justice 
.HQQHG\ DJUHHG ZLWK -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH SODLQWLII¶V SURSRVHG VWDQGDUG WKDW D
majority of voters should be able to elect a majoULW\RIYRWHUVVWDWLQJWKDW³7here is no authority 
IRUWKLVSUHFHSW´(2004, 308). He also agreed that even if this standard could be constitutionally 
justified, there was no way to derive a judicially manageable standard from it. Furthermore, he 
DFFHSWHGWKDWWKHSOXUDOLW\KDGGHPRQVWUDWHG³WKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIWKHRWKHUVWDQGDUGVWKDWKDYH
EHHQFRQVLGHUHGWRGDWH´(2004, 308). Justice Kennedy opinion differs from that of the plurality 
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in that he does not foreclose the possibility that a viable standard may be found. However, he 
endorses tKHSOXUDOLW\¶VDQDO\VLVRISUHYLRXVO\proposed standards. Therefore if Justice Kennedy 
is to be convinced that a standard is viable, it is absolutely necessary to address the objection 
made by Justice Scalia for the plurality. We need to show that the standard we propose is both 
judicially discernable and manageable. 
Fortunately we have the tools to address the challenge posed by Justice Scalia. We can 
show that the majority rule standard can be derived strictly from the equal treatment of 
individual voters, without relying on any argument about group rights. This provides a response 
WR-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VREMHFWLRQ7KH result is based on recent work in mathematical voting theory 
published after Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004). The consequence of this is that partisan 
gerrymandering violates individual, and not just group, rights. Thus we can provide a 
constitutional justification for partisan gerrymandering claims based on Article 1§2 of the 
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
Once we have shown that the majority rule standard can be derived from the 
Constitution, it is necessary to show that it can yield a judicially manageable standard. We can 
do this by showing that applying the majority rule standard nationally logically implies partisan 
symmetry at the state level. There already exists an established, peer-reviewed technology to 
measure partisan symmetry (Gelman and King 1994b, 1994a, 1990). Indeed this measure was 
proposed in an amicus brief for LULAC v. Perry (2006) and discussed in the judgment to that 
case. Justice Kennedy did have some reservation about the measure, but we will argue that these 
can be addressed. Indeed, we can demonstrate the tractability of this measure by calculating it for 
all states in this paper.  
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This paper proceeds in three stages. First we show that it is possible to a find a judicially 
discernable standard for partisan gerrymandering. That is, we can derive such a standard from 
the constitutionally protected rights. We can show that the right to equal protection of individual 
voters implies the majority rule principle ± a majority of voters should be able to elect a majority 
of representatives. Secondly we show that the majority rule principle logically implies the 
partisan symmetry standard. We also consider various objections that have been made to it by 
various Justices. Finally we briefly show how the partisan symmetry standard can be 
implemented. Thus, instead of embarking on a quixotic quest for a new standard, we can show 
that an existing, well-proven measure can be grounded in the Constitution. 
II. A Discernable Standard? 
Let us consider the majority rule standard for political gerrymandering proposed by the 
plaintiffs in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) ± a majority of voters is denied the ability to elect a 
majority of representatives. If this is to be a viable standard for political gerrymandering, it is 
necessary to show that it is both judicially discernable and manageable ± that is, it can be derived 
from a constitutionally protected right and can be practically applied. This section considers 
whether the standard is judicially discernable, while the next considers whether it is manageable. 
The claim that partisan gerrymandering violates constitutional rights is derived from the 
claim that the Constitution guarantees an equal right to vote DQG WR KDYH RQH¶V YRWH FRXQWHG
equally. There are two sources for this claim: Article 1§2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment. The Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964a, 7-8) IRXQG WKDW ³WKH
command of Art. I, 2, WKDW5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVEHFKRVHQµby tKH3HRSOHRIWKHVHYHUDO6WDWHV¶  means 
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much 
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as another's.´ The Court found that this implies that if congressional elections are held by district 
(as opposed to statewide), then the districts must be of equal size.  
In Reynolds v. Sims (1964b), the Court found that citizens had a right to have their votes 
counted equally, based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.3 The Court found 
that the right to vote is protected by the Constitution (1964b, 554). Given that refusing to allow 
someone to vote is a constitutional violation, then so is diluting the value of their vote by other 
means, such as ballot stuffing or not counting certain votes. If these are constitutional violations, 
then so is GLOXWLQJ VRPHRQH¶V YRWH E\ XQHTXDOO\ VL]HG GLVWULFWV 7KH &RXUW (1964b, 555) 
FRQFOXGHVWKDW³WKHULJKWRIVXIIUDJHFDQEHGHQLHGE\DGHEDVHPHQWRUGLOXWLRQRIWKHZHLJKWRID
FLWL]HQ
VYRWHMXVWDVHIIHFWLYHO\DVE\ZKROO\SURKLELWLQJWKHIUHHH[HUFLVHRIWKHIUDQFKLVH´ 
The claim that partisan gerrymandering is a constitutional violation is an extension of the 
claims made in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964a) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964b),IGLOXWLQJDSHUVRQ¶V
vote by drawing unequally sized districts violates their right to vote, then surely so does cleverly 
manipulating the shapes of districts to achieve the same effect. After all, Reynolds v. Sims 
(1964b, 563) ILQGVWKDWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQIRUELGV³sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes 
RI GLVFULPLQDWLRQ´4 and that, ³:HLJKWLQJ WKH YRWHV RI FLWL]HQV GLIIHUHQWO\ by any method or 
means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seePVMXVWLILDEOH´LWDOLFVRXUV). 
However, there has been considerable ambiguity as to how partisan gerrymandering would be 
treated. As early as 1965, the Supreme Court declared in Fortson v. Dorsey (1965) that diluting 
the vote of a racial or political group could be unconstitutional, even if there was no 
malapportionment; and in White v. Regester (1973) a districting plan was overturned on grounds 
                                                 
3 The exception to this is, of course Senate elections, where the Constitution explicitly demands 
that election be held by State. 
4 Citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275  
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that it was a (racial) gerrymander. Both these cases, however, involved multimember districts. It 
was not until Davis v. Bandemer (1986) that the Court stated unambiguously that partisan 
gerrymandering could constitute a constitutional violation, even when there were properly 
apportioned single member districts. 7KH&RXUWIRXQGWKDW³WKHFODLPLVWKDWHDFKSROLWLFDOJURXS
in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political 
JURXS´FRXOGEHMXGLFLDEOHXQGHUWKH(TXDO3URWHFWLRQ&ODXVH(1986, 124). However, the Justices 
were unable to reach a majority position on what the standards for judging what constituted a 
partisan gerrymander. 
In Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) the Supreme Court effectively made claims of partisan 
gerrymandering non-justiciable, at least until a new standard could be found. The reason given 
by the five Justices who concurred with the decision was that there did not exist a standard to 
decide such cases that could be derived from the Constitution and be practically applied 
(although in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy maintained the possibility that such a 
standard could be discovered). Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia argues that in principle no 
such standard could exist. Justice Scalia explicitly attacks the argument that allows us to get from 
the equal right to vote to the unconstitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the 
position in Davis v. Bandemer (1986), he argues that political groups have no claim to be treated 
equally; rather only individual voters have Equal Protection rights. In the case of 
malapportionment, the individual right to vote is clearly diluted and debased. However, in the 
case of partisan gerrymandering, Justice Scalia contends, there is no violation of any individual 
right. Rather the claim of constitutional violation is based on an alleged right of proportional 
representation for groups, and such a right is not granted by the U.S. Constitution. 
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Thus Justice Scalia (2004, 288), after noting that the standard proposed by the plaintiffs 
would only invalidate a district plan if it prevents a majority of voters from electing a majority of 
representatives, argues: 
³ZHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHULWLVMXGLFLDOO\GLVFHUQLEOHLQWKHVHQVHRI being relevant to some 
constitutional violation. Deny it as appellants may (and do), this standard rests upon the 
principle that groups (or at least political-action groups) have a right to proportional 
representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle. It guarantees equal 
protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently 
sized groups. It nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or 
Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded political strength proportionate to 
WKHLUQXPEHUV´ 
To the extent that existing arguments for the unconstitutionality of partisan 
JHUU\PDQGHULQJUHO\RQDJURXSULJKW WRSURSRUWLRQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ6FDOLD¶VDUJXPHQWDSSHDUV
decisive. There is no dispute that the Constitution does not enumerate a right to proportional 
representation for groups. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) appear to rely 
on just such a claim, simply asserting that a majority partisan group ought to have the right to 
elect a majority of representatives. Similarly, the argument made for partisan symmetry by four 
political science professors in LULAC v. Perry (King et al. 2006, 4) is that it allows us to 
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU³DGLVWULFWLQJSODQXQIDLUO\EXUGHns the representational rights of a particular 
political group´,WDOLFVRXUV).  
However, it is not clear why a right to group proportional representation is necessary to 
justify the majority rule standard ± there may be other grounds for this conclusion. We will argue 
that other such grounds do indeed exist and that they are based strictly on the equal protection of 
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individual voters. It can be shown that the equal treatment of all individual voters logically 
implies the majority rule standard ± a majority of the voters must be able to elect a majority of 
representatives. Or to put it another way, in partisan elections it is not logically possible to treat 
all voters equally without treating all parties equally as well. 
The formal result that this argument is based on comes from Hout and McGann (2009a, 
2009b). Roughly speaking, this result states that if an electoral system for a legislature treats all 
voters equally and satisfies some other necessary qualities, then it must give more seats to the 
party that wins more votes. In a two-party system, the larger of the two parties must have a 
majority of the vote, and if it receives more seats than its rival, must have a majority of seats. 
Thus political equality implies the majority rule standard. The importance of this result is that it 
allows us to get from liberal political equality ± the equal protection of individuals ± directly to 
the principle that a majority of voters should be able to elect of majority of representatives.  
This does require two assumptions. Firstly we consider the composition of the legislature 
as a whole, as opposed to considering just the individual districts. We can justify this both by 
appealing to Article 1§2 of the Constitution, and on the grounds the output of the legislature does 
in fact depend on the action of the legislature as a whole and not just on its individual parts. 
Secondly, we have to consider the partisan balance of the legislature as an important part of the 
results of Congressional elections. This is justified not because we assign rights to partisan 
groups, any more than we assign rights to demographic or religious groups; this is justified 
because the U.S. Congress as a matter of fact organizes itself on partisan lines. We turn next to 
the detailed justification of these two assumptions. 
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A. Assumptions 
For the argument developed here to go through, it is necessary that voters have a right to 
equal protection in regard to the results of congressional elections as a whole; and that it is 
legitimate to consider the partisan balance of power as important part of that result. We doubt it 
would be difficult to convince political scientists, political journalists or politicians that we do in 
fact have partisan elections and that the overall balance of power in Congress as a whole matters. 
7KHGD\DIWHUWKHHOHFWLRQQHZVSDSHUKHDGOLQHDUHOLNHO\WRUHDG³5HSXEOLFDQVUHWDNH+RXVH´RU
³'HPRFUDWV UHWDLQ +RXVH´ ,W LV QRW OLNHO\ SDURG\LQJ WKH ODZ UHYLHZ DUWLFOH FLWHG E\ -XVWLFH
6FDOLDWKDWWKH\ZLOOUHDG³7KHUHZHUHVHparate elections between separate candidates in separate 
GLVWULFWVDQGWKDWLVDOOWKHUHLV´&RQWUDU\WRWKHDVVHUWLRQE\WKHVDPHDXWKRUVpolitical parties 
GRQRWMXVW³FRPSHWHIRUVSHFLILFVHDWV´WKH\DOVRFRPSHWHIRUFRQWURORIWKH+RXVH7REHIDLr 
to Lowenstein and Steinberg (1985), they are correct in asserting that parties do not compete for 
statewide vote totals, and that ZHFDQQRWVLPSO\LQIHUDSDUW\¶VVWDWHZLGHVXSSRUWE\DGGLQJXS
the district totals.) 
It may seem like common sense that we have partisan elections in which the overall 
result matters. This, however, does not automatically means that there is a constitutional basis for 
considering the House of Representatives in such a manner. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
denied that results of Congressional elections as a whole can be used as evidence of 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) is 
particularly assertive about this. However, all the dissenting opinions other than that of Justice 
Breyer also accept this point. In fact the plurality in Davis .v Bandemer (1986) comes to the 
same conclusion. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection clause, it is necessary to 
produce a district specific claim. 
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Let us first consider why it is appropriate to consider the composition of the House as a 
whole. What we are faced with here are two differing conceptions of representation. When we 
consider the House as a whole we are thinking of it as a single deliberative body representing the 
people. If its overall composition is stacked against me, then I have been wronged. We can 
contrast this to what we might call DQ ³DWRPLVWLF´ RU ³GLVWULFW EDVHG´ YLHZ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ5 
Provided the process by which I elect my representative passes muster, I have received equal 
protection. I cannot argue that the overall process by which Congress is elected discriminates 
against me. It is as if each representative is treated as a separate, individual magistrate as 
opposed to a member of a representative body. The assumption seems to be that because I only 
get to vote for the member from my district, that Member and that Member alone represents me, 
as opposed to the House as whole. 
There are two lines of argument for considering the House of Representatives as a single 
legislative body rather than as a collection of district representatives. The first is derived from 
Article 1§2 of the Constitution and applies specifically to the House; the second is drawn from 
more general considerations of political philosophy and applies to legislatures generally 
(including potentially state legislatures). Turning to Article 1§2, we can see that this certainly 
GHVFULEHV HOHFWLRQV WR WKH +RXVH LQ FROOHFWLYH WHUPV ³7KH +RXVH RI 5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV VKDOO EH
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.´
,QWHUHVWLQJO\LWGRHVQRWHYHQVD\³WKH3HRSOHVRIWKHVHYHUDO6WDWHV´EXWUDWKHUXVHVWKHVLQJOH
FROOHFWLYH QRXQ ³3HRSOH´ ± that is, the people of the United States.  There is nothing here to 
support the view that an individual voter is only represented by their representative and thus does 
not have a stake in the composition of Congress as a whole. Rather the House of Representative 
                                                 
5 6HHDOVR:HLVVEHUJ¶V(1978) distinction between dyadic and collective representation. 
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as a whole is to be chosen by the people as a whole. Indeed districts are not even mentioned in 
Article 1 ± Article 1§4 gives sWDWHVDXWKRULW\RYHUWKH³7LPHV3ODFHVDQG0DQQHU´RIHOHFWLRQV
but gives the United States Congress the power to overrule them. 
In the Federalist Papers likewise we see the House of Representatives described as a 
single national legislature representing the people as a whole. After all, as is argued in Federalist 
39, the House of Representative represents the principle of national government, while the 
federal principle (that is, territorial representation) is represented by the Senate. Thus Federalist 
VWDWHV³7KH+RXVHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVZLOOGHULYHLWVSRZHUVIURPWKHSHRSOHRI$PHULFDDQG
the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in 
WKHOHJLVODWXUHRIDSDUWLFXODU6WDWH´6LPLODUO\LQ)HGHUalist 52 LWLVDUJXHG³$VLWLVHVVHQWLDOWR
liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is 
particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration [the House of Representatives] 
should have an immeGLDWH GHSHQGHQFH RQ DQG DQ LQWLPDWH V\PSDWK\ ZLWK WKH SHRSOH´ 2QFH
again, the conception of representation is collective ± the House as a whole needs to be bound to 
the people as a whole in relations of dependence, sympathy and common interest. 
The Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964a) reiterates the same arguments. The 
Great Compromise led to the House representing the people directly and the Senate representing 
the States. As stated above, this is taken to imply a very high level of political equality in House 
elections, with every voter being weighted equally. The district principle is not privileged in any 
way in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964a). District elections are not constitutionally necessary and are 
only permitted to the degree that they do not interfere with the principle that one person¶VYRWHEH
ZHLJKWHGHTXDOO\WRDQRWKHU¶V7KH&RXUWQRWHVWKDWWKLVSULQFLSOH³LVIROORZHGDXWRPDWLFDOO\RI
course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread 
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practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history´(1964a, 8). States may, if they wish, elect 
Representatives by district, but only as long as this does not frustrate the requirement that the 
House be chosen ³E\ WKH3HRSOH of the YDULRXV 6WDWHV´$VD UHVXOW VWDWHVPD\QRW ³GUDZ WKH
lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a 
&RQJUHVVPDQWKDQRWKHUV´(1964a, 14) 
Thus a strong case can be made for considering the composition of the House as a whole 
based on Article 1§2 of the Constitution. In addition to this, we can also argue that it is necessary 
to consider the composition of the House as a whole based simply on its nature as a legislature. 
After all, it is the performance of the House as a whole that affects my wellbeing. The House as 
a whole deliberates and passes laws, not individual members. The output of the House is 
legislation, and this is intrinsically a collective good. Whether the House passes laws that protect 
me or do me harm depends not on me having a personal representative, but rather on the entire 
body. The need to consider the composition of the House as a whole does not depend on its 
mode of election, but on its nature as a collective decision making body. 
It is possible for me to have the ability to elect my representative in a fair and proper 
manner, but for the legislature as a whole to be stacked against me. Consider the following 
scenario. The districting and election administration of the district in which I live are beyond 
reproach. However there are serious abuses (whether malapportionment, gerrymandering or 
outright fraud) in other districts. This results in massive misrepresentation, so that my 
representative and those of similar opinion are outvoted. Indeed because of the overwhelming 
artificial majority in the legislature created by the abuses, my representative and those of similar 
opinion are irrelevant to policy and law making. By the standards of all the Vieth v. Jubelirer 
(2004) opinions except that of Justice Breyer, I cannot claim that I have been denied equal 
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protection ± I am able to elect my representative. Presumably someone in the other districts could 
claim that their right to equal protection had been violated, unless the abuse was gerrymandering. 
I, however, cannot because I do not have a district specific case (my district is fine) and I cannot 
make a case based on the overall composition of Congress. Nevertheless, it appears preposterous 
to claim that I have received equal protection when the composition of Congress is stacked 
against me and I can reasonably expect my representative to be completely ignored. 
It is also notable that the Supreme Court has not always endorsed an atomistic, ³GLVWULFW
EDVHG´ FRQFHSWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ )RU H[DPSOH ZULWLQJ IRU WKH SOXUDOLW\ RI WKH &RXUW LQ
Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003, 482) ± in fact, for the very same plurality as in Vieth v. Jubelirer 
(2004) ± -XVWLFH2¶&RQQRUDUJXHVWKDW³,QGHHGLQDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\WKHYHU\SXUSRVH
of voting is to delegate to chosen representatives the power to make and pass laws.´ That is to 
say, the purpose of voting is to influence the provision of the collective good of policy, not just 
to provide districts with appropriate representation. As a result, it is possible to balance the 
benefit to a minority population from having influence in a broader number of districts against 
having an almost guaranteed ability to elect a group member in a smaller number of districts 
(2003, 479-481). Of course, Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) dealt with The Voting Rights Act as 
opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment (see Grofman 2006). Nevertheless, there is clear tension 
between two incompatible conceptions of representation. 
Given that it is appropriate to consider the overall composition of the House of 
Representatives, let us turn to why it is appropriate to think of it in partisan terms. This is a more 
difficult task. The Constitution does not mention parties, any more than it mentions districts. We 
may often take it for granted that we have partisan elections in the United States. Justice Scalia, 
however, in the section quoted above argues that parties have no special status ± they are simply 
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social groups comparable to farmers or Christian fundamentalists (2004, 288). Nevertheless there 
seems to be something different about the partisan nature of the House. We can talk about the 
Democrats or the Republicans winning the House. We would not talk about men, Protestants or 
non-southerners winning the House in the same sense. The question is, what is it that makes 
elections to the House of Representatives objectively partisan, as opposed to party just being one 
demographic description amongst others? 
The reason we can consider the partisan composition of House as part of the result of a 
House election is the House as a matter of fact organizes itself on partisan lines. This partisan 
organization of the House is an objective institutional fact. If this partisan result is systematically 
biased against certain individuals, or if certain individuals are not given a fair opportunity to 
influence this result, then they can reasonably claim that they have been denied equal protection. 
They could also claim that the House has not been chosen by the People in the strongly 
egalitarian sense advanced by the Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964a). 
The partisan balance of power in the House of Representatives has a number of direct 
institutional consequences that voters have a right to be concerned about. Members caucus in the 
House of Representative on the basis of party. The majority party chooses the Speaker of the 
House. Which party has a majority will influence the distribution of committee assignments, and 
in particular committee chairs. The majority party will have a number of procedural advantages, 
in terms of control of the Rules Committee and the Calendar (see Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
2005; Boyce and Bischak 2002). Which party has a majority determines certain significant 
national posts and is likely to have a strong influence on the character of legislation passed. 
In fact, elections to the House of Representatives would still be partisan even if there 
were no partisans in the electorate. Imagine that the entire population was independent and no-
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one had a partisan group identity. Provided that the legislature still organized itself on partisan 
lines, we still ought to care about the partisan balance in Congress. The Democrats or 
Republicans would not be identifiable groups in the electorate who could demand the right to 
elect members of their group ± everyone would decide each election on its merits. However, the 
partisan balance would still matter ± it would determine how the House of Representatives was 
organized. The newspapers the morning after the election would still report that the Democrats 
or Republicans had captured or retained the House.  
Neither is the partisan nature of House elections dependent on party line voting in the 
House. The level of party discipline in the House has varied over the years, although it has never 
gone away altogether. If there is very strong party line voting, the output of the legislature will 
be almost completely determined by its partisan composition. However, even if this is not the 
case, as long as the parties can remain cohesive long enough to organize the House, the partisan 
composition of the House will determine the leadership, the committee assignments and other 
structures such as the rules and the Calendar. These factors will affect the legislative output of 
the House, even if members do not always vote on party lines. 
Thus a strong case can be made for both considering the results of House elections as a 
whole (as opposed to a series of unrelated district elections), and for considering these results in 
partisan terms. The results need to be considered as a whole because the output of the House 
(legislation) is intrinsically a collective good, and is determined by the entire House, not by 
individual members. The results need to be considered in partisan terms because the House as a 
matter of fact organizes itself along partisan lines. If someone were denied an equal opportunity 
to influence the partisan composition of the House as a whole, it would seem reasonable for them 
to claim that they did not enjoy the equal protection of the law and that the House was not 
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chosen by the people. Given these assumptions, we can proceed to the formal, social choice 
theoretic argument. 
B. Individual Rights and the Majority Rule Standard 
We may now turn to the formal result. Stated intuitively, if we treat everyone equally, 
then in a two party system the results must respect the majority rule standard ± if a party wins a 
majority of the vote, it must get at least 50% of the seats. More precisely, if we treat every 
individual voter equally; and we do not discriminate against specific parties or candidates on the 
basis of their names; and we do not punish parties for winning more votes than they need; then if 
a party wins more votes than another party, it must win as many seats, if not more. In a two party 
system, this produces the majority rule standard. The importance of this result is that the standard 
that a minority of voters cannot elect a majority of representatives does not have to rest on a 
principle of group representation. Rather it can be justified strictly in terms of equal treatment of 
individuals. 
The result comes from Hout and McGann (2009a, 2009b). It is Proposition 1 in both of 
these articles. It is based on an earlier result from Hout, Swart and Veer (2006). The Hout and 
McGann articles go further than we need, introducing further assumptions to produce a 
justification of proportional representation based on a liberal conception of individual equality. 
We do not need or rely upon these additional assumptions for the argument in this paper. 
The result does require that we think of the election result in terms of a seat allocation 
function. A seat allocation functions is just an abstraction that takes the vote of each individual 
voter and returns an allocation of seats to each party. How it does this is left open. A seat 
allocation function is thus an abstraction that can accommodate the details on any electoral 
system. However, it does consider the election result as a whole and considers it in terms of seat 
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allocations to parties. This is why it was necessary to argue that it is justified to view the election 
result in this way. 
We can now turn to the axioms required by the result. The idea of political equality is 
captured by two axioms, anonymity and neutrality. If a seat allocation function is to treat all 
voters equally it must be anonymous. This means that it does not discriminate between voters 
based on their names. If we change the names of the voters this does not change the results. An 
obvious example of a seat allocation system that is not anonymous is a system that gives some 
people more votes than others. However, there are many more subtle ways that electoral systems 
can discriminate between voters and thus violate anonymity. 
Neutrality means that a seat allocation rule does not discriminate between candidates or 
parties on the basis of their names. If we exchange the name of two parties then we must also 
exchange their seat allocations. Neutrality is a minimal requirement of any democratic electoral 
rule. It is satisfied by the electoral systems of all liberal democracies, including the United States. 
It does not prevent certain parties being advantaged in terms of where their support comes from. 
It only prevents the explicit advantaging of certain parties purely in terms of their identities. 
The final axiom we need is a technical one ± nonnegative responsiveness. This means 
that a party cannot be penalized for winning extra votes when it retains all its previous support 
and nothing else changes. Suppose that a party wins the votes of certain voters and is awarded 
certain seats. Suppose then that the same party retains the support of all those voters, and no-one 
else changes their vote except for some voters who switch their vote to the party we are 
considering. Then nonnegative responsiveness means that the party must get at least as many 
seats as before. This is a minimal requirement that is met by every reasonable single vote 
electoral system, including the first-past-the-post system used in the United States, although a 
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case can be made for relaxing it when considering ordinal voting systems (where voters rank 
order the candidates as opposed to voting for only one.6 
If an electoral system satisfies the requirements of political equality (anonymity and 
neutrality) and the common sense requirement of nonnegative responsiveness, then it can be 
shown that it must satisfy the weak plurality ranking property. The weak plurality ranking 
property means that if one party wins more votes than another party, it must receive at least as 
many seats. In a two party system this means that the minority party cannot be awarded a 
majority of the seats. 
The proof that anonymity, neutrality and nonnegative responsiveness imply the plurality 
ranking property is given in Hout and McGann (2009a, Proposition 1, 2009b). Here we can 
consider the intuition behind the formal proof. We proceed in two steps. First we demonstrate 
why anonymity and neutrality imply something called the cancellation property. Then we show 
that if we add nonnegative responsiveness to this we get the weak plurality ranking property. The 
cancellation property is the property that if two parties have the same vote total they must be 
allocated the same number of seats. Let us see why anonymity and neutrality imply this property. 
Consider the voter profile in Table 1. This lists each voter and places an X under the party this 
voter votes for. Thus voter 1 votes for Party A, voter 2 for Party B, voter 7 for Party C and voter 
8 abstains. There may be any number of voters, but in this example we only consider the first 
eight. First let us consider a situation, as in Table 1, where two parties have the same number of 
votes. Let us suppose that the cancellation property is not true, and that one party gets more seats 
                                                 
6 Multiple vote systems such as plurality run-off and single transferable vote violate nonnegative 
responsiveness in some cases. This is because it is possible for a party to increase its support and 
cause another party to be eliminated in that round than otherwise would be the case. As a result, 
the party faces a stronger competitor in a later round and loses a seat. 
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than the other (let us assume A gets more seats, for the sake of argument). We can show that this 
is impossible if anonymity and neutrality are respected. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Firstly let us change the names of all the voters who vote for Party A and Party B. Each 
voter who votes for Party A gets the name of a voter who voted for Party B and each voter who 
voted for Party B gets the name of a someone who voted for Party A. Thus voter 1 is renamed 
voter 2 and voter 2 is renamed voter 1. Alternatively we could think of this as each voter who 
voted for Party A now voting for Party B and each voter who voted for Party B now voting for 
Party A. (Given that the number of voters for each party is assumed equal, the voters match up 
one-to-one.) This gives the voting profile in Table 2. If the electoral system respects anonymity, 
this changing around of the voters can make no difference to the result. Therefore Party A must 
still be allocated more seats than Party B. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Next let us change the names of the parties. Let Party A now be called Party B and Party 
B now be called Party A. This gives us the voting profile in Table 3. By neutrality, if we change 
the names of the parties this is not allowed to change the allocation of seats. The party previously 
known as Party A (now known as Party B) must win more seats than the Party now known as 
Party A (previously Party B). That is to say, if Party B gets the support of all the voters who 
previously supported Party A, by neutrality, Party B must get all the seats that were previously 
allocated to A. Thus Party B must now receive more seats than Party A. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The problem is that if we look at Table 3, we see that it is identical to Table 1, except that 
order of the rows and columns is different. If we rearrange the rows and columns of Table 3 
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without changing who votes for whom, we end up with a voter profile identical to Table 1 (voter 
1 votes for Party A, voter 2 votes for Party B, etc.). By anonymity and neutrality, with the votes 
in Table 3 Party B must get more seats than Party A. But Table 3 is identical to Table 1, and we 
started by assuming that in Table 1 Party A gets more seats than Party B. What we have shown is 
that if Party A gets more seats than Party B despite having the same number of votes, then Party 
B must also get more seats than Party A. This is obviously impossible. The only way out of this 
contradiction is to assign the same number of seats to parties with the same number of votes. 
This is the cancellation property. 
By adding the requirement of nonnegative responsiveness we can go from the 
cancellation property to the weak plurality ranking property. The weak plurality ranking property 
requires that if one party wins more votes than another party, it must get at least as many seats as 
it. Suppose we have a voting profile where Party A gets more votes than Party B. Now suppose 
that some of ParW\$¶VYRWHUVDEVWDLQVRWKDWWKHYRWHWRWDOVIRU3DUW\$DQG3DUW\%DUHLGHQWLFDO
By the cancellation property (which we have already shown can be derived from anonymity and 
neutrality) the two parties must receive an equal number of seats. Now let the abstaining voters 
go back to supporting Party A. By nonnegative responsiveness, Party A cannot be disadvantaged 
by this, it still must have at least as many seats as Party B. This is the weak plurality ranking 
property. If there are only two parties, this is equivalent to the majority rule standard (the party 
that receives a majority of the vote should receive at least half the seats in a two party system). 
The significance of this result is that it shows that the majority rule standard for electoral 
districting can be derived solely from the principle of the equal protection of individual voters. It 
does not depend on the principle that equally sized groups are entitled to equal representation, a 
principle that is not to be found in the Constitution. Rather it is based on the requirement that 
 22 
individual voters receive equal protection in determining the overall result of the election. Given 
that the House of Representatives is institutionally partisan, this provides a standard of electoral 
justice that can be derived from Article 1§2 of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment. 
III. A Manageable Standard? 
We argued in the last section that the majority rule standard can be derived from the 
requirement that the House of Representatives be elected by the people and from the equal 
protection of individual voters. However, if political gerrymandering is to be adjudicated in the 
courts, it is necessary to provide a standard that is not only judicially discernable ± derived from 
a constitutionally protected right ± but also judicially manageable. That is to say, there needs to 
be a method to determine whether unconstitutional political gerrymandering has occurred in a 
specific case. In the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004, 288), Justice Scalia argues that 
the plaintiffs would be unable to provide a manageable standard, even if their proposed standard 
was judicially discernable. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy notes that the Court has 
not been shown a  ³VWDWHPHQWRISULQFLSOHGZHOO-accepted rules of fairness that should govern 
GLVWULFWLQJ´(2004, 308), although he leaves open the possibility that these may be found. 
Of course, until we have a viable judicially discernable standard, the question of judicial 
manageability is moot. However, in the last section we laid out the case for the majority rule 
standard being such a standard. Given this, we can consider how this standard can be 
implemented. There already exist well-established techniques for measuring whether the 
majority rule standard is violated. For example, given established patterns of voting, we can 
calculate the probability that a given districting plan will result in a majority of voters not 
electing a majority of Representatives. 
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One complicating factor, however, is that districting plans are produced by each state, 
while the justification of the majority rule standard in the previous section applies to the House 
of Representatives as a whole. This is a direct consequence of Article 1 of the Constitution. 
Section 2 states that the House of Representatives shall be elected by WKH³3HRSOHRIWKHVHYHUDO
6WDWHV´6HFtion 4, on the other hand, gives states authority over the ³7LPHV3ODFHVDQG0DQQHU´
of elections, although it gives the United States Congress the power to overrule them. We thus 
need to produce a standard that can be applied to state districting plans that ensures that the 
majority rule standard is respected nationally. 
Requiring that each state's districting plan satisfy the majority rule standard does not 
guarantee that a majority of voters nationally will be able to elect a majority in the House of 
Representatives. To ensure this, we require a stricter standard at the state level, that of partisan 
symmetry. 3DUWLVDQ V\PPHWU\ LV GHILQHG DV WKH UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW ³the electoral system treat 
similarly-situated political parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction of legislative 
seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party would receive if it had received the same 
SHUFHQWDJH´(King et al. 2006, 4-5).7 
Let us turn now to how the partisan symmetry standard can be constitutionally justified. 
The previous section showed that the majority rule standard is a logical consequence of the 
requirement that the House be elected by the people and the equal protection of all voters, and 
thus can be justified in terms of the Constitution. If partisan symmetry is, in turn, a necessary 
condition for satisfying the majority rule standard, then any violation of partisan symmetry 
implies a violation of the election of the House by the people and the equal protection of voters. 
                                                 
7 7KDWLVWRVD\LISDUW\$ZLQVRIWKHYRWHWR3DUW\%¶VDQGJHWVVHDWVRXWRI
then party B would have to get 14 seats if it was to win 60% of the vote. 
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All that remains is to show that partisan symmetry in statewide districting is a necessary 
condition for the majority rule standard to apply to Congress as a whole. 
In the case of the justification of the majority rule standard in the last section, the partisan 
outcome that matters is the balance of Congress nationally ± that is, who holds a congressional 
majority. We have argued that the balance of the parties is an inescapable part of the result, not 
because voters think of themselves as partisans, but because Congress organizes itself along 
party lines. That is, the partisan nature of the result is an institutional fact. However, this 
argument applies to Congress as a whole, not the individual state delegations. Who has a 
majority in Congress has major institutional and political consequences; who has a majority of 
the (say) Pennsylvania delegation does not, at least not to the same degree. If we are to treat all 
U.S. citizens equally, then it is necessary that a majority of voters nationally should be able to 
elect a majority of representatives. 
However, the constitutionality of state districting plans has to be judged on a state-by-
state basis. While we have a decentralized system where each state draws its own districts (that 
is, the power of Congress to overrule the states is not invoked), states cannot be required to draw 
its districts based on how they expect other states to draw theirs. In principle we could maintain 
national partisan majority rule by having the Court force states to co-ordinate so that the bias in 
different states cancel out. In effect the Court would have to order one state to make its 
districting biased in favor of party A in order to balance out the bias in favor of party B in 
another Ssate. This would be a revolutionary change, effectively nationalizing the districting 
process. Given that this is unlikely to be acceptable, the only alternative is to demand that all 
states district in such a way that it would be unbiased in its own right. Only by doing this can we 
guarantee that a national majority of voters can elect a national majority of representatives. 
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Partisan symmetry is a necessary condition of a state districting plan that ensures that a 
majority of U.S. voters can elect a majority of representatives, and thus ensures that all voters are 
equally protected. Clearly, the weaker quality of the majority rule standard at the state level is 
also necessary. If state districting plans are biased so that a minority can elect a majority of a 
state¶s delegation, it is obviously possible that a national minority may be able to elect a 
congressional majority. However, the majority rule standard at the state level is clearly not 
enough. Imagine that we had a districting plan that gave a majority of a sWDWH¶V GHOHJDWLRQ WR
whichever party won a majority of the sWDWH¶V YRWH +RZHYHU, suppose this districting plan 
resulted in Party A winning 16 seats out of 20 if it won 55% of the statewide vote, but only gave 
Party B 11 seats out of 20 if it won 55%. If such a districting scheme was generalized nationally, 
it could clearly give Party A a majority in Congress even if it only won a minority of the votes. 
To ensure that the party that wins the national vote gets a majority of the seats, it is necessary 
that both parties be treated equally in the event that they win 55% of the vote ± that is, we must 
require symmetry. 
Symmetry at the state level is a necessary condition for guaranteeing a national majority 
can elect a congressional majority, but it is not a sufficient condition: This requires the stronger 
condition of statewide proportionality. The problem with statewide proportionality is that 
achieving this might require overhauling the entire U.S. electoral system. Even if statewide 
proportionality is not practical in the context of the United States, statewide symmetry clearly is 
± many state districting schemes have satisfied it (see Gelman and King 1994a, 546). And 
although statewide symmetry does not guarantee that a national voter majority will elect a 
majority of seats, it does severely reduce the scope for bias nationally. 
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Thus we can see that partisan symmetry is a necessary consequence of ensuring that a 
majority of voters can elect a majority of representatives, which is itself a necessary consequence 
of the election of the House by the People and the equal protection of individual voters. Partisan 
symmetry has the added advantage of being clearly measurable. In fact the technology to 
measure it is already well developed and peer-reviewed (see King et al. 2006; Gelman and King 
1994b, 1994a, 1990; King and Browning 1987).  
It might be objected that the symmetry measure is based on counterfactual reasoning. 
However, it is entirely appropriate that a measure of electoral fairness be based on counterfactual 
reasoning, because the concept of fairness in a contest is inherently counterfactual. Rules are not 
unfair because they happen to produce a particular outcome in a particular case; they are unfair 
because of the outcomes that they would produce under different conditions. Whether I happen 
to win a lottery or not has no bearing on whether the lottery is fair or not; whether a lottery is fair 
depends on what would have happened if the world had turned out differently ± that is, on 
whether I had the opportunity to win that I was promised. A baseball game where one team has 
to hit the ball 400 feet for a home run, while the other team has to hit it 500 feet, is unfair 
(assuming no justifying circumstances) even if in a particular game no batter hits the ball 400 
feet or more. It is unfair because if (hypothetically) the ball had been hit 450 feet, the two teams 
would have been treated differently. The two teams did not have the same opportunity to score a 
home run.  
Justice Kennedy in the plurality opinion on LULAC v. Perry (2006, 420) adroitly notes 
that WKHPHDVXUHGHSHQGV³RQFRQMHFWXUHDERXWZKHUHSRVVLEle vote-VZLWFKHUVZLOOUHVLGH´This 
is inescapable for any measure because the actual results in a district-based election system 
depend on where voters live. It is in the nature of district-based electoral systems that 50 voters 
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changing their votes in one district may change the result, while 50,000 voters changing their 
votes in another district may have no effect at all. What the symmetry measure assumes is that 
the relative pattern of support for parties remains relatively stable compared to what it has been 
in the recent past. This appears to be the case empirically, and the extent to which this is not so is 
reflected in the estimates of bias. This assumption of approximately uniform partisan swing (see 
King 1989, 796-8) does not appear to be controversial amongst political scientists. For example, 
as Grofman and King (2007, 15) point out, the expert witnesses for both the plaintiff and the 
defendant in LULAC v. Perry (2006) ³ZHUH LQ UHPDUNDEOH DJUHHPHQW DERXW WKH SDUWLVDQ
implications of the plans whose partLVDQELDVWKH\LQYHVWLJDWHG´,QGHHGLQKLVGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQ
Justice Stevens (2006, 465-6) used the counterfactual results of the sWDWH¶V H[SHUW 3URIHVVRU
Gaddie) to show that proposed plan violated the symmetry standard. 
Justice Kennedy (2006, 420) also argues that the amici fail to provide a standard for 
deciding how much partisan asymmetry is too much. In response, Professors Grofman and King 
(2007, 5) echo Justice Stevens¶ (2006, 468) opinion that it is the place of the Court, not social 
scientists, to set the standards for what is constitutional and what is not. However, the amicus 
brief (2006) certainly does provide workable standards that the Court could choose to adopt. For 
example the Court could adopt a quantitative standard ± Justice Stevens (2006, 468) suggests 
that the Court could adopt a 10% deviation from symmetry standard, similar to the 10% standard 
for malapportionment. Another alternative suggested by the amici is that a districting plan be 
considered unfair if it deviates from symmetry by at least one whole seat. Social scientists can 
provide a precise measure of how unfair a districting plan is, just as an expert witness on DNA 
evidence can provide a precise estimate on the probability of a false identification; neither, 
however, can tell a court exactly how much uncertainty constitutes reasonable doubt. 
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If the Court is unsure about the appropriate standard, it could choose a standard that is 
conservative. For example it could overturn plans that both have statistically significant bias at 
the 5% level and deviate from symmetry by at least a whole seat.  Where there is reasonable 
doubt, the courts would have to allow the original plan to stand. However, it is important to 
realize in the case of a considerable number of states it does not really matter which test we use ± 
these states violates virtually any conceivable test of partisan symmetry. As we will see in the 
next section, the partisan asymmetry of the current Pennsylvania districting plan is not 10%, but 
36%. The probability of this happening by chance is not the 5% conventionally required in 
scientific inference; it is essentially zero. The number of seats at stake is not one, but rather four. 
There will be hard or borderline cases where the choice of standard will matter. However, with 
Pennsylvania and many of the most biased states, this is simply not the case. It seems strange to 
argue that the courts cannot offer relief in cases of egregious partisan gerrymandering because 
there may be some hard cases where the exact choice of standard may make a difference. 
Various Justices in the case of LULAC v. Perry (2006) responded favorably to the 
partisan symmetry test proposed to the amici (2006) ± for example Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justice Breyer (2006, 468) FRPPHQG LW DVEHLQJ ³DKHOSIXO WKRXJKFHUWDLQO\QRW WDOLVPDQLF
WRRO LQ WKLV W\SH RI OLWLJDWLRQ´8 However, based on social science results that were not yet 
published at the time of LULAC v. Perry (2006), it can be argued that it is considerably more 
than this. Rather than simply being one potential test amongst many, partisan symmetry is a 
necessary condition for a districting scheme that provides equal protection to all individual 
voters. While partisan symmetry ostensibly measures fairness to parties (which is not 
                                                 
8 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, (2006, 483) GRHVQRW³UXOHRXWWKHXWLOLW\RID
FULWHULRQRIV\PPHWU\DVDWHVW´-XVWLFH.HQQHG\(2006, 420), writing for the plurality, does not 
completely dismiss the usefulness of the measure, DOWKRXJKKHFRQFOXGHVWKDW³DV\PPHWU\DORQH
LVQRWDUHOLDEOHPHDVXUHRIXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSDUWLVDQVKLS´ 
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constitutionally protected), it is logically entailed by the equal protection of individual voters, 
which does enjoy constitutional protection. If partisan symmetry is violated, then we can 
conclude with no further evidence that individual voters are not being treated equally in a way 
that may substantially change the composition of Congress or even change the overall result of 
the election. 
IV. Measuring Partisan Asymmetry in Practice 
We can demonstrate how the proposed measure of partisan symmetry can be calculated. 
We follow the approach of Gelman and King (1994b). However, we do not use the JudgeIt 
software later developed by those authors, but rather do the estimation ourselves using R 
software. Full details of the estimation is given in McGann et al. (forthcoming). To summarize, 
we generate a seats/votes function for each state ± how many seats would a party get if it won a 
certain percentage of the vote. We can calculate this from the actual election results in each 
district using the assumption that the swing in support between the parties is approximately 
evenly spread across the districts.9 Of course, we realize that in reality that there are many local 
and idiosyncratic factors at work in addition to changes in the aggregate level of party support. 
For this reason we run a thousand simulations ZKHUH WKH SDUW\¶V VXSSRUW LQ HDFK LQGLYLGXDO
district is changed by a random amount. (Empirical evidence suggests that these local effects are 
large, averaging five percentage points.) From these seats/votes functions we calculate symmetry 
scores for each state. These measure the degree to which the Democrats and Republicans receive 
the same number of seats for the same seat share ± a score of 0 indicates symmetry, while 100% 
                                                 
9 We used the two-party vote share in each district. In districts where both parties did not run, we 
used the Presidential vote apportioned over the Congressional district as an instrument to 
estimate the relative support of the two parties. 
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means the Democrats get all the seats if their vote share is between 45% and 55% and -100% 
means that the Republicans get all the seats under the same conditions. 
We should note that the model underlying these calculations is extremely simple.10 We 
simply take the current distribution of support and ask what would happen if Democratic support 
increased or decreased by a certain amount in every district. We could produce a simplified 
version of this using nothing more than a spreadsheet. Of course, this simplified model would 
not take into account how local or idiosyncratic factors could disturb a gerrymander, and would 
not give us a way to measure the uncertainty of our estimates. However, it is important to 
remember that advanced math and statistics are not required to make a prima facie case of 
partisan gerrymandering. Having said that, from a legal point of view it is extremely important to 
be able to provide precise margins of error and measures of how certain we are that partisan bias 
exists.11 This, indeed, is a major advantage of this approach. 
We can consider a couple of real world examples. Massachusetts in Figure 1 is an 
unbiased winner-take-all plan. It is approximate unbiased, as can be seen from the symmetry of 
the graph. (There is actually a small bias towards the Republicans, but this is not statistically 
significant, and makes no difference given that the Democrats typically win 65-70% of the vote).  
                                                 
10 We would note that it is possible to estimate more complex models of district level voter 
behavior taking into account a variety of other factors. Indeed, software such as JudgeIt allows 
such models. We have deliberately not estimated a complex behavioral district level model. Our 
interest is not in district level behavior, but rather in how the districting scheme mechanically 
translates a hypothetical uniform change in support across districts into a change in seats. We 
would be particular skeptical of models that use factors such as incumbency and candidate 
quality as explanatory variables, which surely should be treated as endogenous. Of course, we 
accept that many factors other than overall support for a party can affect the vote in a given 
district. This is why we run thousands of simulation with large random perturbations of the result 
in each individual district. 
11 The uncertainty surrounding of estimates of bias will vary for a variety of reasons. For 
example, we would expect the margin of errors to be larger for states with only a small number 
of districts, as small vote changes could produce very large changes in the proportion of seats 
going to each party. This, indeed, is exactly what we find. 
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It is extremely responsive between 40% and 60% of the vote ± 1% more in vote share means 
3.6% more in seat share. This responsiveness is, of course, advantageous to the Democrats. They 
are able to win all ten Massachusetts seats. However, the plan is not biased. If the Republicans 
were to win 65-70% of the vote in Massachusetts, they would also win all ten seats. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 gives the seats/votes function for Pennsylvania in 2012, which is a highly biased 
districting plan. As is apparent, it is far from symmetric. In fact the graph misses the 50% 
votes/50% seats point by 20 percentage points! The symmetry score is actually 36% in favor of 
the Republicans. It is moderately responsive between 45% and 55% of the vote ± its score is 1.4.  
At 50% of the vote, the Democrats expect to win about 30% of the seats. The slope of the curve 
does increase sharply a bit past 50%. However, the Democrats would need to win between 57 
and 58% of the vote to win half the seats. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
We can carry out this procedure for every state. Appendix 1 gives the symmetry scores 
for every state and indicates in which states this bias is statistically significant. It also gives the 
5% and 95% confidence intervals. One thing that is notable is that the symmetry measure very 
clearly distinguishes between those states with unbiased districting plans and those with strong 
partisan bias. The majority of states clearly do not have statistically significant partisan bias, and 
would face no risk of litigation if this standard were adopted. However, most of the states that do 
have significant bias have very high levels of bias. Small changes in methodology would not 
affect the conclusion in such states. Indiana is the only real borderline case. This is important 
because Justice Kennedy raised the concern in his opinion on Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004, 308) that 
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in the absence of a clear standard confining judicial intervention, the results of cases would be 
³GLVSDUDWH DQG LQFRQVLVWHQW´ The symmetry standard, however, gives clear, unambiguous 
guidance on when intervention is necessary and when it is not. 
V. Conclusion 
The absence of a standard for partisan gerrymandering that is acceptable to the Supreme 
Court means that even the most egregious cases of partisan gerrymandering cannot be 
challenged. Nevertheless, however tempting it may be, we cannot just make up a suitable 
standard. A standard for partisan gerrymandering needs to be both scientifically and legally 
valid. It must be scientifically valid in that it is a correct measure of the phenomena we are trying 
to capture ± there is no point having an excellent measure if it is measuring something else. It 
also has to be legally valid in the sense that it is judicially discernable (can be derived from a 
constitutionally protected right) and judicially manageable (provides clear guidance for judicial 
decision making). 
The way to find a standard of partisan gerrymandering that is judicially discernable and 
PDQDJHDEOHLVQRWWRVHWRXWRQDTXHVWIRUDP\VWHULRXV³QHZ´VWDQGDUGWKDWQRVFKRODURUODZ\HU
has yet had the gumption to recognize. Neither is it to try to mold a standard out of fresh clay 
based on our readings of decades-old legal opinions. Rather, we contend, we should take the 
valid measures given to us by established science and work far harder at showing that these 
represent something that can be grounded in constitutionally protected rights. 
Having said this, it is necessary for our measure of partisan gerrymandering to meet the 
needs of legal adjudication. A complex multivariate model with fourteen explanatory variables 
may well get published in a political science journal, indeed even a top political science journal. 
Such as model, however, would be problematic as the basis for a judicial standard. It would be 
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too easy to challenge the exact specification of the model, and there would always be the 
suspicion that if the model were specified slightly differently it would yield different results. We 
would note that a growing number of methodologists in political science advocate simpler 
models for this reason (Achen 1999, 2005; Taagepera 2008). In addition to being scientifically 
valid, a legally useful measure needs a number of other qualities (see, for example, Hastie 2011). 
For example, it needs to be reliable (when recalculated, it gives the same result), predicatable 
(interested parties can anticipate the result) and be equitable (similar cases produce similar 
results). These goals are best served by measures that are relatively simple. While the nature of 
partisan gerrymandering means that we need to rely on statistical techniques to measure it, we 
should choose the simplest and most transparent versions of these techniques possible. 
We have provided a legal justification for partisan symmetry as a standard for 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases. Using recent results from mathematical social 
choice theory, we have shown that the majority rule principle can be derived from an individual 
right to equal protection. Given that the majority rule principle is judicially discernable, we show 
that the majority rule principle applied at the national level logically implies the partisan 
symmetry standard at the state level. Partisan symmetry is the primary accepted measure of 
partisan bias in political science, and there already exists all the technology we need to measure 
it. Thus we have the fortuitous result that our legal argument provides a constitutional 
justification for the very measure political scientists already use to measure partisan 
gerrymandering. Furthermore, as we have shown, it is a measure that is judicially manageable in 
that it gives clear guidance as to when the Courts should act and when they should not. 
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